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Michael Keating
Centre on Constitutional Change, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland
ABSTRACT
European federalism must be conceived at multiple levels, not just that of the
state and the EU. A regional level has emerged below and across the states,
as a result of spatial rescaling: the migration of functional systems, political
change and the institutionalization of the regional level. The sub-state region
remains a contested space, both as to its territorial boundary and its control.
The EU itself has used the regional level for the framing and implementation
of its own policies. Regional politics are characterized by inter-regional
competition. Demands for recognition and autonomy from below have added
another dimension. There is not a uniform regional level of politics or policy
but a variety of constructions of the region. Federalism helps us understand
this changing dynamic, if it is seen not as a specific form of government but
as a general principle of order, combining unity with diversity.
KEYWORDS Competition; federalism; regions; rescaling
Introduction
As the editors of this collection note, EU studies have been dominated by a
division between intergovernmental and neo-functionalist perspectives. For
the intergovernmentalist, the unit of analysis is the nation-state, often seen
as a more-or-less unitary actor, but this risks reifying the state and seeing it
as the sole interface between Europe and sectoral or territorial actors within
states. Neo-functionalism overcomes this methodological statism but is criti-
cized for its teleology and failure to explain what has actually happened.
Both approaches eschew normative questions. The federalist perspective
opens the European level as a political arena, examining policy-making and
interest mediation and the complex relationships between national and Euro-
pean levels. It reintroduces normative issues like balancing power, subsidiar-
ity, sovereignty, representation and solidarity.
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This is a useful move but incomplete. If we are to apply federal perspective
at the European level, then logically we must open up to other spatial levels,
including the sub-state level. Yet the sub-state level is not a fixed and know-
able set of units that might be captured by a federal-type constitution, but a
highly heterogeneous and shifting field. Spatial rescaling is altering the
relationships between function, political mobilization and institutions. Euro-
pean integration and regional government can be seen as twin efforts to
recapture policy fields that have escaped the purview of nation-states but,
as Livingston (1952) noted, there is often a disjunction between federal insti-
tutions and underlying sociological patterns. Rescaling upwards and down-
wards are contested projects, which cannot be resolved by reference to
purely functional arguments.
The importance of the sub-state level has been emphasized in a series of
debates around the Europe of the Regions; the territorial perspective on EU
policy and delivery; the impact of Europe on intra-state federalism; the poten-
tial for accommodating self-determination claims within the overarching
European framework; and the representation of territorial interests in the
EU policy process. There is a search for mechanisms to institutionalize this
‘third level’, but they have reached no resolution. The multilevel governance
approach opens up the black box of the state and emphasizes complexity, but
it has weak ontological and normative foundations. The federal perspective
has the analytical advantage of focusing on relationships among territory,
function and institutions while also addressing normative issues including
representation, sovereignty and solidarity. It must, however, take account of
recent developments in federal theory, which historicize it and point away
from the US model. That is the point of departure for this paper, which sees
federalism as a set of analytical principles, rather than a fixed form of govern-
ment. Europe is not a federation in most recognizable senses but federalism
can help us to understand its territorial dimension. In the following I develop
this by means of the notion of rescaling.
Rescaling Europe
Modernist social science long predicted the eclipse of territory as a principle of
social organization (Durkheim [1964]). Accounts of state-building saw it as a
process of territorial integration and functional differentiation in which politics
followed behind social change. For Deutsch (1972), this would reach its limits
when one nation-building project met another or when cleavages were so
deep as to force the establishment of another state. As Rokkan (1999)
showed, however, some of the major social fault-lines continued to run
through states. A conceptual map of Europe could be drawn that was not con-
fined to the boundaries between states but recognized the underlying com-
plexities. The idea that territory would disappear as a principle of social
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organization resurfaced in the aftermath of the Cold War, with a spate of pub-
lications around the theme of the end of territory or the borderless world
(Badie [1995]; Ohmae [1995]). Most of these in fact referred to the end of
the state as the dominant marker of territory as seen in realist accounts of
international relations, and belong in the broad category of globalization
studies. If we detach territory conceptually from the nation-state, however,
we get a more complex picture. There was less a de-territorialization of econ-
omic and social systems than a re-territorialization as functions and political
articulation were moving to new scales above across, and below the state.
This is the process of rescaling, in which territory not only survives as a
legacy of the past but is continually reproduced (Brenner [2009]; Jessop
et al. [2008]; Keating [2013]).
The best documented forms of rescaling are functional, in which economic
and social systems are escaping the purview of the state andmigrating to new
levels. There is a substantial literature on economic rescaling at the global level,
focused on the internationalization of markets, free flows of capital, a new
international division of labour and the rise of global corporations. Transna-
tional free trade regimes and global trading rules are both cause of, and reac-
tion to, these processes. There is a literature on the rise of sub-state regions as
economic spaces and frames for understanding economic change. Some of
this is rooted in spatial location theory, economies of proximity and transport
costs (Krugman [2011]). Institutional versions focus on the provision of public
goods and the balance between competition and cooperation in fostering
growth. These fade into sociological explanations, based on social capital
and behaviour, and into cultural explanations rooted in historically conditioned
social norms. Regions and localities are presented as not merely locations of
production but as production systems (Crouch et al. [2001]). A further move
is to see these regional systems as being in competition with each other in
global markets. The argument is that Ricardian comparative advantage, in
which each region has its place in the global division of labour, has given
way to absolute or competitive advantage (Scott [1998]). While this idea has
been challenged intellectually (on the grounds that it reifies the region and
that only firms compete), the theme of territorial competitiveness has been
taken up by states, the European Commission and international organizations.
Welfare has been linked to the nation-state since this is the focus both of
affective solidarity and of social compromise and provides the institutional
infrastructure for welfare programmes. Yet as the field of welfare itself recon-
figures to adapt to changing demographic structures and new social risks,
there is a rescaling, to sub-state and transnational levels (Ferrera [2005];
Kazepov and Barberis [2008]). Other examples of functional rescaling
include the simultaneous localization and internationalization of higher edu-
cation, or the way in which urban dynamics challenge old conceptions of the
functions of government or social stratification (Keating [2013]).
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There is a corresponding rescaling of systems of regulation and policy-
making. It is tempting to see the rescaling of government as a response to
functional imperatives, as in the neo-functionalist approach. Alesina and Spo-
loare (2003) explain the ‘size of nations’ by reference to functional imperatives,
arguing that the benefits of scale that existed in an earlier age have disap-
peared because of open markets and transnational order, so that smaller
units are viable and desirable. Ohmae (1995) similarly describes a (rather ima-
ginary) world of small competing ‘regional states’ as the inexorable conse-
quence of functional change and globalization. Hooghe and Marks (2009)
invoke functional arguments to explain (at least partially) decentralization
and the division of competences within states. Yet there is a danger here of
a functionalist trap. Purely functional arguments risk becoming teleological
in that the beneficial outcome is seen as the cause of the change that it fol-
lowed. What is needed is a mechanism by which the functional requirements
can impose change. So a variant of the functionalist argument is that changes
in the level at which activities are regulated are a response by policy makers to
considerations of efficiency. This moves the argument away from causes to
reasons but reasons are never simply given by neutral consideration of effi-
ciency; they always have some underlying normative principle. So public
choice exponents have preferred smaller units of government so that they
will compete and align preferences with territory (Tiebout [1956]); others
have preferred larger units to constrain competition and allow redistribution.
Interests are also at stake, since some may be better connected to particular
scales than others and boundaries of territorial jurisdictions may be drawn to
favour specific social groups.
Both European integration and decentralization are better appreciated not
as a functional imperative but as a design on thepart of state actors to recapture
and regulate functions that have escaped their purview as a result of rescaling
and to impose a specific logic on to them. If this is presented as amatter of tech-
nical imperatives, thatmaybe a rationalization formore normative objectives or
in an effort to depoliticize difficult policy spheres, especially when they can be
taken both out of contested politics and to a spatial scale that itself is insulated
from direct political contestation. So in the Eurozonemonetary policy has been
taken up to the supranational level and also, in conformity with contemporary
professional wisdom, placed in the hands of an independent institution. At the
sub-state regional level, development policy has often been depoliticized,
entrusted to agencies and ad hoc bodies with the single goal of competitive
growth. An example is the repeated efforts to establish a regional level of plan-
ning and intervention in England, stopping short of devolving political power.1
In France, the state has consistently sought to reinforce its own territorial admin-
istration to match any political decentralization.
De-politicization is rarely effective in the long term, given patterns of social
stratification and conflict and the distributive effects of any given policy or
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strategy. So we see a re-politicization of the new spaces emerging at various
territorial levels and a contestation over their boundaries, their social signifi-
cance and their institutionalization. Opposition movements may mobilize at
the sub-state level where they are weak at the centre. Autonomist and iden-
titarian movements map onto territory, creating a bottom-up regionalism.
Faced with the need for functional capacity on the one hand, and bottom-
up pressures for more popular input, contestation of priorities and legitima-
tion on the other, many states have instituted an intermediate, regional or
‘meso’ level of government (Keating [1998, 2013]; Swenden [2006]). There
also is a rescaling of the representation of social and economic interests
and their reconfiguration at new levels, in response both to functional rescal-
ing and the establishment of regional government (Keating and Wilson
[2014]). So the new spaces are ‘filled in’ socially and politically and the political
agenda is structured in different ways. In the 1980s and 1990s it was argued
that Europe had regions without regionalism as the formal structures of
administration did not correspond with any sociological reality (Le Galès
[1997]; Pastori [1980]; Trigilia [1991]); now the regionalism is there (Keating
and Wilson [2014]). As emerging spaces are politicized and excluded groups
seek entry into the governing arrangements, the political agenda is broad-
ened. State regional policies focused on economic development in a
narrow economic sense are challenged in respect of their social and environ-
mental impact.
In this way, regions are constituted as political communities. This does not
mean, pace Alesina and Spoloare (2003), homogeneous spaces in which
people share the same policy preferences or ethnic identity. A political com-
munity, rather, is a frame of reference for deliberation and social compromise.
There is a parallel here with the European project, operating at a new supra-
national level, which has also been progressively politicized. Just as we get
different visions of Europe – market driven, social, technocratic, instrumental,
cultural and so on, so regions are constructed and imagined differently. Their
construction and meaning is thus contested and highly political. Their territor-
ial boundaries are similarly not pre-given but reflect political preferences and
power relations.
Rescaling has also been induced by the EU’s own spatial policies, which
were introduced (as regional, then structural and then cohesion policy) in
order to correct the tendency of the single market to concentrate develop-
ment and exacerbate territorial disparities. In the early days, it was assumed
that the single market would eliminate territorial disparities as goods, services,
capital and labour could move freely, so that each territory would specialize
on the basis of comparative advantage. From the 1970s it was apparent
that this was not happening and support grew for an explicit policy of territor-
ial equalization across the Community. This coincided with the increasing dif-
ficulty that states experienced in using regional policies to integrate their
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national territory economically. Diversionary policies are expensive and diffi-
cult when firms can relocate elsewhere in Europe or outside Europe, one of
the factors encouraging competitive regionalism. European competition
policy itself bars state aid, including regional subsidies, except under strict
conditions. The resulting disparities created pressure for the EU itself to
enter the field with its own spatial policies.
From its beginnings in the 1970s, the instrument was contested among the
European Commission, member states and regional governments, with a Eur-
opeanization and then a partial renationalization (Hooghe and Keating
[1994]). It was torn between a social rationale, as a territorial compensation
measure, and an economic one, as efficiency-enhancing. In recent years,
the Commission has emphasized territorial competitiveness, in line with
current thinking. It has also sought a territorial perspective on other policy
instruments, including planning, research and environment, but this has not
progressed far, given the reluctance of sectorally based directorates to
accept a spatial approach. Regional policy is frequently in conflict with com-
petition policy, which is more strongly embedded in the institutions and
enforced by the Court of Justice.
In elaborating and especially in implementing its spatial policies, the Com-
mission has sought territorial collaborators and partnerships including
regional governments, economic actors and civil society. This has the effect
of increasing the salience of the regional and local level and creating links
between it and the EU itself. During the 1990s, it was sometimes imagined
that the Commission’s aim was to restructure territorial government, bring
regions into being or even by-pass the nation-state, but this was misleading
(Keating et al. [2015]). The Commission was concerned above all to strengthen
the capacity for delivering policy and, if this meant strengthening the centre,
then they pressed for that, as in the new accession countries in 2004 (Hughes
et al. [2004]; Keating and Hughes [2003]). In much of Western Europe,
however, structural policy was represented by local politicians as the fruit of
their own efforts in Brussels, creating a vision of regions operating in Euro-
pean space. It was also true that in many cases the Commission and the
regions shared a common interest in denationalizing the policy and ensuring
that the moneys flowed as directly as possible from Brussels to the regions.
So neither the nation-state nor the European Union has experienced a
straightforward functional imperative to territorial integration and homogen-
ization. On the contrary, they have promoted territorial differentiation in new
forms. The conjuncture of rescaling towards Europe and down towards the
regions has created multiple levels of politics and of authoritative decision-
making, which escape the logic of EU-state relationships. It has posed a chal-
lenge to traditional efforts to understand the European Union based on either
intergovernmentalism or a federalism based on the member states. These
issues fed into a set of movements around a Europe of the Regions, or the
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politics of three-levels (Bullman [1994]). This was a very diverse project, whose
common aim was to find a place for sub-state regions in the emerging trans-
national order, with a strong orientation towards European federalism as an
alternative to intergovernmentalism. The movement culminated in the
1990s. Regions gained little from the Convention on the Future of Europe,
where the Committee of the Regions was present with observer status, or
from the subsequent Lisbon treaty, and the movement declined after that.
Multilevel governance or multilevel federalism
One conceptualization of the emerging spatial order, and alternative to both
intergovernmental and neo-functionalist accounts, has been that of multilevel
governance (Bache and Flinders [2004]; Hooghe and Marks [2001]; Piattoni
[2010]). The idea is that power has been pulled out of the state, both laterally,
by the implication of non-governmental actors in policy-making, and verti-
cally by the emergence of new territorial levels so that networks span both
the public-private and the territorial divides. This has the virtue of addressing
the complexity of modern policy-making and regulation, taking us back to the
ideas, rooted in classical sociology and theories of local government (Maas
[1959]), that social systems are differentiated functionally and territorially,
but without the teleological assumption of much modernization theory,
that function would overcome territory.
It is not clear, however, that multilevel governance provides the analytical,
ontological or normative tools to address these issues. The concept of govern-
ance itself is notoriously loose. Sometimes it is a broader than government,
referring to social order in general, with government as a sub-category
(Pierre and Peters [2000]). Sometimes it is narrower, a form of regulation
based on networks rather than hierarchy (Bellamy and Palumbo [2010]).
This, however, poses an ontological problem. Network governance, derived
as it is from organization theory, takes as its unit of analysis organizations
or actors within them, but these remain socially disembedded, rather than
corresponding to broader patterns of social stratification. Second, governance
lacks a theory of power, focusing on interaction and cooperation in networks
but without providing tools to explore who wins and loses and how. It seems
better designed for consensus management than social conflict, which is no
doubt why the concept has been appropriated by international agencies
set on depoliticization. Third, governance theories lack a normative dimen-
sion, which would allow us to pose questions about democracy, participation,
accountability and distribution. There is sometimes an implicit normativity,
but this cuts both ways. On the one hand, it is suggested that network or cor-
poratist governance are somehow more participative, although this remains
empirically unproven (Smismans [2006]). On the other hand, there is an argu-
ment that it undermines representative elected government. Fourth, if
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governance is seen as the interlinking of public and private power, then it is
not clear that it adds to studies of interest group politics, neo-corporatism and
social concertation. Multilevel governance approaches, moreover, lack of a
theory of territory; indeed, the concept of level seems to be used in a very
imprecise way. Multilevel governance works tend to confine the vertical
level to relations among institutions of different territorial reach, without
embracing the deeper implications of territory and scale.
Of course, it may just be that the very lack of conceptual precision around
multilevel governance makes it attractive in the absence of a clear way of
thinking about the organization of space. In this sense, it describes a negative,
the escape of functional systems from existing forms of regulation and politics
and from existing territorial boundaries, rather than to a particular mode of
governing or regulation.
If intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism and multilevel governance
cannot capture the emerging complex, multiscalar order in Europe, federalism
may serve better as a way both of analyzing and appraising it. Yet we must
note the editors’ warnings on how federalism is to be interpreted. It is not
to be seen as confined to states or, especially, to the experience of the
United States of America. Federalism is a broad principle not to be confused
with federation as a specific constitutional design (King [1982]). It is an analyti-
cal device but also has a normative underpinning, based on values including
shared rule, self-rule and solidarity. It does address some of the ontological
weaknesses of multilevel governance in that the focus is on government as
authoritative decision making. Federalism is about dividing and sharing
power at a territorial level and the relationship between those levels. There
is an emphasis on territory, enriched if federalism is combined with the
insights of rescaling theory. Federalism does address normative issues includ-
ing legitimacy and sovereignty and electoral consent. It incorporates argu-
ments about citizenship and representation.
Federalism comes in different forms, as recognized in the literature
(Burgess [2006, 2012]). There is a distinction between coordinate and coopera-
tive federalism, with a newer variant, competitive federalism. There is also a
debate about whether federalism requires a unitary national identity or
whether it can usefully be applied in plurinational polities. These debates
are highly pertinent to the debate about rescaling.
Coordinate, cooperative and competitive federalism
There is a classic distinction between coordinate federalism, in which compe-
tences are clearly divided between the levels, and cooperative federalism, in
which they are shared. In some respects, Europe challenges both varieties by
undermining existing federal or quasi-federal arrangements within member
states with a significant meso level. This includes Germany, Austria,
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Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent Italy and other
states. Competences belonging to the regional level have been Europeanized,
which results in a double loss of power for the regions. The European Union
may encroach on regional competences, so taking away what the state has
conceded. At the same time states can re-enter these policy fields since it is
they who are represented in the Council of the EU. In the 2000s, Europeaniza-
tion has also penetrated down to the local and regional level through its
requirement for debt and deficit limits, which apply to all levels, while it is
the state that is responsible for ensuring compliance internally.
Regional responses have alternated between seeking to protect their own
competences (in coordinate mode) and seeking entry into European policy-
making (in cooperative mode) – between ‘leave us out and ‘let us in’
(Jeffery [2005]). Some regions, including the German Länder, have been at
pains to curtail European interventions in their reserved spheres, coinciding
with a push to simplify German federalism itself and reduce its coordinate
elements. It was pursued by seeking application of the principles of subsidiar-
ity and proportionality embodied in the treaties at the regional level rather
than stopping at the states. Provisions were incorporated into the Lisbon
Treaty but the mechanisms to enforce this are weak. The main thrust,
however has been for regions to seek to get into the EU policy process (‘let
us in’).
To the functional and institutional arguments for involvement, regional
advocates added some normative ones, claiming that regional governments
were democratically elected and thus had a higher legitimacy than other
organizations lobbying in Brussels and even than the Economic and Social
Committee; stronger regions could also make a contribution to realizing the
aim of subsidiarity. Enhancing their influence would address the democratic
deficit, bringing government closer to the citizen.
Provisions for the participation of regions in EU policy were made in the
(Maastricht) Treaty on European Union through two channels: directly into
the EU and via member states. The Committee of the Regions was established
as a consultative body with the same status as the Economic and Social Com-
mittee. Some enthusiasts saw it as an embryonic territorial third legislative
chamber. Its scope was subsequently expanded to cover a wider range of
policy areas and to include the European Parliament as well as the Commis-
sion but it remains purely consultative. Its other principal weakness lies in
the variation of what constitutes a region across the different EU states.
There are federal units, such as the German Länder, which have a defined
role in national policy making. There are devolved regions such as those in
Spain and Italy, with their own power but not formally part of a federal
system. The alliance of Regions with Legislative Powers was an effort to
stake out a distinct position but the meaning of ‘legislative powers’ differs
from one state to another and the distinction was more political than legal.
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There are cities, which have insisted on parity of status with regions, although
their competences are different. Then there are stateless nations, which
sought to play the Europe of the Regions card while also insisting on their
own specificity (see below). Cities insisted that they were as important as
regions and should have the same status.
The main channel for participating via the member states is a provision
that, where regional governments exist with a ministerial structure2 they
can, where national law permits, represent their state in the Council of the
European Union. They do not, however, represent themselves and represen-
tation is confined to matters of regional competence. Provisions for determin-
ing the line to take in negotiation vary from Belgium, where each federal unit
has a veto, through Germany, where the Länder agree a position among
themselves, to the United Kingdom, where the central government has the
final say.
The European Commission has, for its part, sought to incorporate regions
into the policy process, both to increase policy effectiveness and to
enhance its visibility and legitimacy at the sub-state level. It insists that its col-
laborators should not merely be regional governments but the social partners
as well.
In recent years, coordinate and cooperative federalism have been joined by
a third variety, competitive federalism (Dente [1997]). Federated units
compete in two senses: they seek to innovate in policy; and they compete
economically, notably for inward investment and technological advantage.
The latter draws upon ideas of competitive regionalism, in which regions
are conceived of not merely as spaces of production but as production
systems in a world that is moving from traditional ideas of comparative advan-
tage towards absolute advantage (Scott [1998]). Whether regions (as opposed
to firms) actually do compete is a matter on which economists disagree so
that territorial competition is a political construction, postulating a common
territorial interest, alongside or displacing sectoral and class conflicts. The
idea is attractive to regional politicians, who can extend their appeal to the
entire population using a type of neo-mercantilist rhetoric. The idea of territor-
ial competition is also used by states and the European Commission as a way
of disengaging from difficult distributive issues and exploiting the positive
connotations of competition in the modern era. European spatial policy is
increasingly justified by a rhetoric of competitiveness (Begg [2010]), even to
the paradoxical recommendation, inspired by the work of Porter (2001) that
all regions should become more competitive although logically this is
impossible.
Competitive federalism is thus a normatively charged notion. If not con-
trolled, it may provoke a ‘race to the bottom’, as governments cut taxes
and attract firms and wealthy taxpayers, so undermining solidarity and
welfare systems (Volden [2002]). In the traditional European welfare state,
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this was restrained by the centralization of key tax powers and systems of ter-
ritorial redistribution. These relied on conceptions of national solidarity as well
as more instrumental considerations. So within a national market, transfers
from wealthy to poor regions could be accepted to the degree that the
money came back to the wealthy regions in the form of orders for their
goods. Spatial balance could enhance national efficiency by addressing
market imperfections that resulted in congestion in some regions and
under-used capacity in others. If regions are competing within European
space rather than cooperating in national space, these factors are weakened.
More broadly, the European project may be separating previously linked
policy spheres and undermining national welfare bargains. Bartolini (2005)
has drawn attention to the tensions that the new European division of com-
petences provokes. Market regulation is taken up to the European level, while
market compensation in the form of welfare states remains national. National
social compromises unravel as selected actors (notably mobile business) can
exercise ‘partial exit’ by upscaling to the European level or moving out
altogether. We can extend this analysis to the sub-state level, where there
is a further disarticulation of policy spheres by territory. Regions, even more
than states, are borderless spaces, from which wealthy taxpayers and inves-
tors may rather easily relocate.
Theories of fiscal federalism address this issue by advocating that redistri-
butive policies should be located at the highest level. Non-redistributive pol-
icies, about the allocation of local public goods on the basis of local
preferences, on the other hand, could be decentralized, so meeting the cri-
terion of allocative efficiency (Oates [1999]). The EU, however, has a weak
redistributive capacity. Cohesion policy is the main instrument, but the Com-
mission has to justify even this in the name of competitiveness. Wasteful com-
petition is regulated in Europe by the competition policy, whose state aids
rules powerfully constrain the ability of both states and non-state govern-
ments to subsidize investment; but there are frequent complaints that this
restrains their ability to sustain vital public services. State aid rules have
been invoked to strike down subsidies for the proliferation of regional airports
and low-cost airlines, but have also, for example, affected the ability of gov-
ernments to cross-subsidize vital ferry services to fragile communities.
Moreover, the old distinctions among production-enhancing, redistributive
and allocative policies are breaking down with the recognition that all public
policies have a distributive impact (Keating [2013]). So it is not sufficient to
argue that the redistributive capacity should be concentrated at the level of
the nation state. If solidarity is important, it needs to be built in to all levels
as well as into the system of relationships among the levels. The trick for Euro-
pean federalism would thus be to provide incentives for the ‘race to the top’ in
social provision that has also been seen in some member states (Gallego and
Subirats [2011]). Arguments about rescaling and regions in Europe thus
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 625
intersect with arguments about the social dimension. Federalism, as the
editors note, is about differentiation but it is also about solidarity. This is
recognized in the incorporation into the Lisbon Treaty of the objective of ter-
ritorial, alongside social and economic cohesion, but the redistributive
capacity of the EU is weak compared with national federal systems.
Plurinational federalism
One vision of federalism insists that there must be a unitary demos and telos so
that there is no disagreement about the foundations of sovereignty and the
federation can be symmetrical. This monist approach (Karmis and Norman
[2005]) has been associated with writers from varied perspectives, including
Carl Schmitt (Cyr [2010]) and later Tarlton (1965). John Stuart Mill is often
quoted in favour of the monist view but, while arguing for homogeneity as
a favourable condition for federalism, he did concede that plural federations
might be necessary in some circumstances (Mill [1972]). It is argued that asym-
metrical federations are unstable and that units based on national distinctive-
ness will arrogate sovereignty to themselves and generate centrifugal and
even separatist tendencies. This underlies objections in Canada, Spain and
the United Kingdom (before the end of the twentieth century) to asymmetri-
cal territorial government and a preference for either centralization or sym-
metrical devolution. The paradox is that federalism is ruled out as a way of
addressing diversity.
In recent years, however, there is a literature questioning this and advocat-
ing the idea of multinational federalism and asymmetrical solutions (Burgess
[2006, 2012]; Burgess and Gagnon [2010]; Requejo [1999]; Noël [2013]) and
stressing the pluralist basis of federalism (Hueglin [2013]). In these cases, fed-
eralism is possible in the absence of shared demos and telos, by mutual
accommodation and effective institutions. Multinational federations may
leave critical foundational issues (such as the locus of sovereignty) in abey-
ance and leave the future open-ended in a rescaling world where the onto-
logical basis of self-government is itself shifting as new territorial scales are
constructed and given meaning. It is consistent with a view of Europe that
sees it as a work in permanent construction without a clear end state. It
also implies relaxing assumptions about the automatic legitimacy of existing
states as the only basis for Europe. Now that states themselves are challenged
from above and below, they increasingly have to justify their own legitimacy.
There have been debates about national identity in France, Spain, the Nether-
lands, Germany and the United Kingdom, while state-wide parties have
insisted on the primacy of the state for security, control of migration or
social solidarity. The fact that they have to make these arguments explicitly
illustrates the point that there is no a priori reason to give normative supre-
macy to one level of another.
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Europe has seen a recurrence of autonomist, nationalist and secessionist
movements challenging state claims, notably in Spain, Belgium and the United
Kingdombutalso in Italy. In central andeasternEurope, irredentistpressures chal-
lengestateboundaries, for example in thenameofethnicHungarians inRomania
and Slovakia. Many of these movements are based on historic territories, which
have been repoliticized and draw on themes of the new regionalism and the
European context to present themselves as viable economic units. In wealthier
territories, there are complaints about the cost of subsidizing their poorer compa-
triots when they need to compete in Europe; such is the case in Catalonia, Flan-
ders and northern Italy. There is no objective way of distinguishing nationalist
from regionalistmovements, but there is an importantdifference in their self-rep-
resentation and demands. Movements adopt the language of nationalism to
claim sovereignty, that is, original authority not derived from the state. They
argue that they constitute a people or demos, which has a right to its own
polity and to share in the construction of the European project. For some of
these (like the Scottish National Party) Europe lowers the threshold for indepen-
dence by externalizing costly policies, guaranteeing market access and increas-
ing the viability of small states. They argue that if Malta or Cyprus can be full
members of the European Union, there is no reason to exclude them merely
because they do not presently have their own state.
Other movements (including at various times moderate Flemish national-
ists, Plaid Cymru, the Basque Nationalist Party, and until recently the
Catalan Convergència i Unió) have seen in Europe an opportunity to move
beyond the old nation-state model altogether and embrace a ‘post-sovereign-
tist’ vision of self-determination (Keating [2001]; MacCormick [1999]). This
does not mean that sovereignty has disappeared but that it is transformed
and is divided and shared, with multiple sources of original authority. The
post-sovereigntist argument often looks back historically (Herrero de Miñon
[1998]), especially in places where the monistic view of state sovereignty
has never been universally accepted (Scotland and the Basque Country are
examples). It also looks forward, as its exponents explicitly link the idea to a
view of Europe as a political order in its own right, enjoying elements of orig-
inal authority, not merely derivative of state sovereignty (MacCormick [1999]).
It is more difficult to translate this into practice. Some have dreamed of a
Europe of the Peoples without the existing states but this assumes that the
peoples who would underpin this are easily identifiable. Challenged on
what their final ambition is, Basque, Catalan and Flemish nationalist politicians
will often throw the question back by asking where Europe is going, since that
is the essential context
Europe has had limited success in addressing the nationalities question. It
has no common doctrine on the recognition of secessionist states in the wider
European neighbourhood, as the confused response to the break-up of Yugo-
slavia showed. Some member states recognize the independence of Kosovo
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while others, struggling with internal tensions, do not. Within the EU, there is a
similar reticence. There is no clear doctrine about secession within member
states or what the European Free Alliance (representing minority nationalist
parties) has called ‘internal enlargement’. Spokespersons for the European
Commission and Council have argued that, were Catalonia to become inde-
pendent, it would put itself outside the European Union.3 Rather incongru-
ously, this seems to accept that Catalonia could become independent in
the first place and thus be outside both Spain and the EU. It would be
more consistent to say that Catalonia cannot be outside the EU because it
can never leave Spain. Commission President José Manuel Barroso declared
that Scotland would put itself outside the EU and would find it difficult if
not impossible to get back in (Andrew Marr Show, BBC Television, 16-02-
2014); this despite the fact that the UK government itself had pledged to
respect the result of the referendum. Weiler (2014) insists on a linear pro-
gression through the state to Europe so that Catalonia and Scotland must
forfeit the right to be part of the European order should they democratically
assume the sovereign status of Spain and the United Kingdom. In fact, there is
a legal vacuum over the question of whether a seceding region could convert
itself into a member state.
While EU leaders have rejected the right of stateless nations to indepen-
dence and membership of the Union, the EU has also failed to provide
many opportunities for the expression of the post-sovereign perspective or
plurinational and multilevel federalism as alternatives. There are opportunities
for stateless nations acting as regions but the EU does not recognize a distinc-
tion between regional demands and self-determination claims. States wishing
to accede to the EU have to respect the rights of national minorities but this
ceases once they become members; the existing states have never wanted
the principle applied to themselves.
Europe has provided a new discursive space for the articulation of nation-
alist demands, linked to ideas of multinational federalism (Keating [2004]). Yet
the promise that Europe could provide a plurinational federalism in which
demands for recognition and autonomy could be accommodated without a
proliferation of new states has been disappointed. States are more willing
to agree to autonomy for internal nationalities but are insistent that accom-
modation must occur within their boundaries. The failure of Europe to
provide new opportunities to express national diversity, as the post-sover-
eigntists have demanded, is one factor that has led nationalist movements
back into support for classic independence, as the case of Catalonia.
Concluding reflections: Europe as multilevel federation
The idea that Europe could or should be a federation in the American tradition
is based, as the editors make clear, on a category error. Federalism is a
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principle that takes multiple institutional forms in different contexts. Similarly,
a conception of Europe of the Regions in which the third level has a clearly
articulated federal status, and constitutes one of the building blocks of the
Union, is misplaced. Yet the federal principle can provide both analytical
and normative leverage over the emerging multilevel politics. It draws atten-
tion away from a strictly statist ontology and towards the multiple levels of
interest articulation, social compromise and policy resolution. It looks away
from functionalism towards a more political explanation for institutional
change. The new levels are not conceptualized merely as organizations in
interaction but as political communities of greater or lesser cohesion and as
governments resting on popular consent. Such communities are constructed
in multiple ways in the process of rescaling and should not be reified or
endowed with unitary interests but represent both political arenas and
actors within a larger system. They have received some institutional recog-
nition and are incorporated into cooperative policy processes, but are not
strongly entrenched. They have succeeded in incorporating the federal prin-
ciples of subsidiarity into the treaties, albeit in a weak form. The idea of com-
petitive federalism is relevant for examining the politics of regions within the
European market and the Commission’s spatial strategy. It coexists uneasily
with the commitment to cohesion, as is the case in modern federations.
The protagonism of regions, however, has been curtailed by the ‘new intergo-
vernmentalism’ (Bickerton et al. [2015]) in the EU, which has closed off oppor-
tunities for regions, which have always preferred the community method.
The principle of plurinational federalism has analytical value in examining
the rise of autonomist movements that saw in the EU both a set of legitimat-
ing principles (shared sovereignty) and political and institutional opportu-
nities to steer a third way between independence and union. States,
however, have guarded their own sovereignty even as it has eroded in prac-
tice. EU policy-makers have avoided the issue, lacking the mandate or interest
to intervene in matters of national sovereignty.
Notes
1. In the 1960s there were regional planning boards and councils: in the 1970s
metropolitan counties (abolished in the 1980s); in the 1980s Urban Develop-
ment Corporations; in the 1990s Regional Offices; in the 2000s regional develop-
ment agencies and unelected councils; now there are city regions looking like
the metropolitan counties but with only one elected official, the mayor.
2. This is subtly different from a legislative region although it may amount to the
same thing in pointing to a differentiation of executive from legislature.
3. José Manuel Barroso, as Commission President, declared “La UE se basa en los
tratados, aplicables únicamente a los Estados miembros que los han aprobado
y ratificado. Si una parte del territorio de un Estado miembro dejase de ser
parte de ese Estado para convertirse en un nuevo Estado independiente, los
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Tratados ya no serían aplicables en dicho territorio. En otras palabras, un nuevo
Estado independiente, por el hecho de alcanzar la independencia, pasaría a con-
vertirse en un tercer país con respecto a la UE y los Tratados dejarían de ser aplic-
ables en su territorio.’ http://www.publico.es/politica/barroso-responde-mas-
catalunya-quedaria.html
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